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Abstract
We examined cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning among East Asian
(Chinese and Korean), Asian American, and European American university students. We
investigated categorization (Studies 1 and 2), conceptual structure (Study 3), and deductive
reasoning (Studies 3 and 4).  In each study a cognitive conflict was activated between formal and
intuitive strategies of reasoning. European Americans, more than Chinese and Koreans, set aside
intuition in favor of formal reasoning. Conversely, Chinese and Koreans relied on intuitive
strategies more than European Americans. Asian Americans’ reasoning was either identical to that
of European Americans, or intermediate. Differences emerged against a background of identical
reasoning tendencies across cultures in the absence of conflict between formal and intuitive
strategies.
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Cultural Preferences for Formal versus Intuitive Reasoning
Consider the following problem: is the Pope a bachelor?
Two approaches suggest themselves to solve this “bachelor” problem, each producing a
different answer. One possibility is an intuitive solution: our understanding of “bachelor” reflects
similarity relations among people who are known to be bachelors. According to this intuitive
approach, the Pope would not be seen as a bachelor. Alternatively, we may represent the concept
of “bachelor” as a person who satisfies the rule, “unmarried, adult, male.”  Under this formal
definition, the Pope, contrary to intuition, indeed would be a bachelor.
This “bachelor” problem illustrates an important theoretical distinction in the psychology
of reasoning. According to this distinction, human thinking is guided by two separate classes of
cognitive strategies that implement different computational principles. One can be described as
intuitive, experience-based, or holistic, whereas the other can be described as formal, rule-based,
or analytic (Evans & Over, 1996; James, 1890; Neisser, 1963; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; for a recent review of the empirical evidence for this distinction, see
Sloman, 1996). The former cognitive strategies are associative or similarity-based in nature, and
their computations reflect temporal contiguity and statistical regularities among features. The
latter recruit symbolic representations, have logical structure and variables, and their
computations reflect rule application. In this paper we use the terms intuitive and formal to refer
to these two distinct reasoning systems.
In recent years, a growing number of research programs in psychology have examined
these two cognitive systems under the rubric of “dual process” theories of thinking, including
deductive reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996), categorization (Rips, 1989; Smith, Patalano, &
Jonides, 1998), analogical reasoning (Gentner & Medina, 1998), decision making (Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1983), belief formation (Gilbert, 1991), and social cognition (Chaiken & Trope,
1999). These two cognitive systems coexist in individuals, interact with each other in interesting
ways (e.g., Gentner & Medina, 1998; Sloman, 1996), and occasionally may be in conflict and
produce contradictory inferences, as in the above “bachelor” problem. Although the intuitive
system tends to dominate, the relative influence of one system versus the other on reasoning has
been found to be influenced by the nature of the task, by instructions that emphasize rule-
following or deduction (Evans & Over, 1999; Sloman, 1996), by the particular reasoning domain
(Atran, 1990; Keil, 1994), as well as by individual differences (Stanovich, 1999).
Little is known about the operation of these two systems of reasoning across diverse
cultural groups. People in all cultures are likely to possess both of these reasoning systems, but
cultural variation may exist in their relative accessibility and use to the extent that different values
are placed on these reasoning systems. Many scholars have documented cultural differences in the
intellectual outlooks of East Asian and Western cultures (Fung, 1952; Lloyd, 1996; Liu, 1974;
Nakamura, 1960/1988). An analytic mode of thought has been held to be more prevalent in
Western cultural groups. This mode is characterized by decoupling of the object from its context,
assigning the object to categories based on necessary and sufficient features, and a preference for
using rules, including the rules of formal logic, to explain and predict the object’s behavior. In
contrast, a holistic mode of thought has been held to be more prevalent in East Asian cultural
groups. This mode is characterized by attention to the context or field as a whole, a concern with
relationships among objects and between the field and the object, and a preference for intuitive
approaches, as well as “dialectical” reasoning, which seeks the “middle-way” between conflicting
propositions.
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Recent evidence indicates that some of these differences in analytic vs. holistic outlooks
find their counterparts in a number of thought processes of contemporary Westerners and East
Asians (for a review, see Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Nisbett & Norenzayan, in
press). For example, East Asians see social behavior as the outcome of person-context
interactions, in contrast to the characteristic American view of social behavior as the unfolding of
dispositions. As a result, East Asians are less prone to the fundamental attribution error (Ross,
1977), or the tendency to overattribute behavior to dispositions despite obvious situational
constraints (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). East Asians are more field dependent (Witkin &
Berry, 1975) than Americans, being more influenced by the position of the surrounding frame
when judging the position of the rod in the rod-and-frame task (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, in press).
East Asians have a more holistic sense of causality: they draw on a wider range of factors to
explain events. As a result, East Asians experience less surprise at unexpected events and show
more hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975), the tendency to view events as having been inevitable in
retrospect (Choi & Nisbett, 2000). East Asians also prefer dialectical resolutions to apparent
contradictions, so that the contradiction is tolerated or a compromise solution is sought.
Americans respond to contradiction by “polarizing” their opinions – deciding that one proposition
is true and the other false (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Davis, Nisbett, & Schwarz, 2000). In this paper,
we examine whether analogous cultural differences can be found in formal and intuitive systems of
reasoning.
Selection of Participants
Participants were self-identified European American, Asian American, and East Asian
undergraduate students, who were otherwise similar in their demographic background and
intellectual ability. In Studies 1 and 2, the East Asians were international students at the
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University of Michigan who were of Chinese or Korean culture, had lived in the US for less than
4 years, had graduated from a high school in East Asia, and grew up speaking an East Asian
language. In Studies 3 and 4, East Asians were Korean students at Yonsei University in Seoul,
Korea. All European Americans were students at the University of Michigan. Asian Americans
grew up in the United States, and were of Chinese, Korean, or Japanese ethnic background. The
Asian American samples were included to examine acculturation effects. Their thinking was
expected to be intermediate between the two other groups, because of their substantial, though
probably not complete, socialization into American traditional culture.
Theoretical Rationale for the Cultural Differences
In each study a simple research strategy was used to measure reasoning preferences. A
cognitive conflict was activated such that formal thinking was pitted against intuitive thinking. If
European Americans favor formal rules more than intuition, they should be more willing to set
aside intuition and follow rules when the two are in conflict. If East Asians favor intuition more
than formal rules, they should be less willing to abandon intuition in favor of formal rules.
We had a different prediction for reasoning based on intuition alone or on rules alone, with
no cognitive conflict present. In these cases responses are a function of cognitive ability, rather
than a function of preference for a particular cognitive strategy. Because we selected our
participants in different cultures so that they were similar in cognitive abilities, we expected no
cultural differences in their ability to implement a formal strategy or an intuitive strategy in the
absence of a conflict between the two.
We examined the extent to which cultural differences might be found for a variety of
cognitive tasks. In Study 1, we examined category learning. Participants were asked to apply a
complex rule as a way of correctly classifying imaginary animals. Their category learning was then
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tested in a situation in which the complex rule conflicted with memory for previously seen
animals. In Study 2, we investigated classification and similarity judgments of drawings (e.g.,
geometric objects, houses, flowers) that admitted either a rule-based judgment or a judgment
based on family resemblance structure. Studies 3 and 4 went beyond immediately perceptible
stimuli to examine conceptual processes. In Study 3, participants evaluated the convincingness of
deductive arguments when logic conflicted with the typicality of the conclusion. Finally, in Study
4 we investigated deductive reasoning when logical structure was pitted against the believability
of the conclusion.
Study 1: Rule- vs. Exemplar-Based Category Learning
If there is a cultural difference between European Americans and East Asians in formal
and intuitive thinking, this difference might be apparent when categories have been learned by the
formal application of rules, and when subsequent classification by rules conflicts with intuitive
knowledge, such as exemplar memory. Rule-based categorization is accomplished by determining
whether or not the novel object satisfies a rule that defines the category by its necessary and
sufficient features, such as when a new neighbor is categorized as a bachelor if he satisfies the
rule, “is an unmarried adult male.”  Exemplar-based categorization, in contrast, reflects similarity
of the novel object to previously stored exemplars retrieved from memory. The more similar the
new object and the retrieved exemplars are, the more likely it is that the new object belongs to the
same category as the retrieved exemplars. Our new neighbor might be suspected of being a
bachelor not because he satisfies some well-articulated rule, but because he is reminiscent of a
bachelor relative.
Study 1 was based on a well-developed paradigm in categorization research (e.g. Allen &
Brooks, 1991; Regehr & Brooks, 1993; Smith et al., 1998). Participants viewed imaginary
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animals on a computer screen and were told that the animals belonged to different categories,
some being from Venus and others being from Saturn. In a training phase, participants learned to
categorize, with feedback, the set of animals. This was followed by a test phase, in which
participants were asked to categorize new animals. Participants in an exemplar memory condition,
which served as a control condition, were asked during the training phase simply to observe a
series of the cartoons and initially make guesses as to which animal belonged to which category.
Feedback was given after each guess. As participants repeatedly categorized the same animals,
they could rely on their memory of previous exemplars to assign the animals to their appropriate
categories. Participants in the rule condition learned a complex rule, making categorizations based
on whether or not the animal had three out of five specific bodily features.
Critically, in the test phase of the rule condition, half of the animals were positive matches:
they belonged to one category by the rule, and also were very similar to a training exemplar from
that same category. The other half of the new animals were negative matches: they belonged to
one category as defined by the rule, but were very similar to a training exemplar from the opposite
category (see Figure 1). Thus the negative match animals -- unlike positive match ones -- posed a
cognitive conflict between rule-based and exemplar-based categorization.
Based on past findings (Allen & Brooks, 1991; Smith, et al., 1998; Patalano, Smith, &
Jonides, 2001), we anticipated that: (1) participants would make fewer classification errors in the
rule condition than in the exemplar memory condition, but take longer because of the necessity to
compute the explicit rule, and (2) participants in the rule condition would make more
classification errors and show slower reaction times for negative matches than positive matches,
that is, when rule and exemplar memory were in conflict than when they were not.
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Most importantly, the cultural analysis led to the prediction that (3) the difference in
classification errors between positive- and negative-matches would be greater for East Asians
than for European Americans, since East Asians would be more inclined to use memory for the
exemplars in the rule condition. Similarly, the difference in response times between positive- and
negative-matches was expected to be greater for East Asians.
Method
Participants
Participants were 61 European American (27 men, 34 women), 61 Asian American (32
men, 29 women), and 28 East Asian (12 men, 16 women) undergraduate students at the
University of Michigan (age M = 19) who received partial course credit for their participation.
Stimuli
The stimuli were color drawings of imaginary animals (from Patalano et al, 2001; see
Figure 1 for examples). The animals were constructed out of 10 binary features: ears (antennae
ears or regular ears), tail (curly or straight), neck length (long or short), mouth (open mouth or
snout), feet (hooves or webbed feet), leg length (short or long), head direction (pointed up or
down), body color (red or blue), body marking (spots or stripes), and body shape (round or
angular). The animals were categorized as being from Venus or Saturn by a 5-feature additive rule
that used ears, tail, neck length, mouth, and feet as diagnostic features. An animal was defined as
being from Venus if it satisfied at least 3 of the 5 diagnostic features; otherwise it was from
Saturn. All Venus animals always satisfied exactly 3 of the 5 diagnostic features; all Saturn
animals satisfied only 2 of the 5 diagnostic features.
Ten different animals were presented 4 different times in the training phase, followed by
20 new animals in the test phase, consisting of a positive match and a negative match to each
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animal in the training phase. The design was counterbalanced, such that half of the animals were
from Venus, and the other half were from Saturn. As can be seen in Figure 1, a positive match
was very similar to its corresponding training exemplar, varying only on one of the irrelevant
features (e.g., head pointed up or down). In contrast, a negative match was also very similar to its
corresponding training exemplar, but varying this time only on one of the features diagnostic of
the rule (e.g., antennae or regular ears). This made it possible for animals to change categories,
yet remain similar to an item in the opposite category. The values of the irrelevant features
appeared equally often in each category, and thus were not diagnostic of category membership.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on a computer. All the instructions and materials
were in English, as all participants, including the East Asian students, were enrolled at an
American university and were fluent in English.
Participants from the three cultural groups were randomly assigned to either the rule
condition or the exemplar memory condition, which served as an experimental control.
Participants in the rule condition were given the rule at the beginning of training, and they
memorized it before beginning the study (post-study interviews indicated that all participants in
the rule group had successfully memorized the rule). Those in the exemplar-memory condition
were never given a rule. They were instructed to guess whether the animal was from Venus or
Saturn the first time they saw an animal, and subsequently categorize new ones by using their
knowledge of previously studied animals. Prior to being presented with the actual animals,
participants practiced with one sample animal as a way to familiarize themselves with the task.
In the training phase participants were given a total of 40 trials, consisting of 10 different
animals categorized 4 times each, 1 animal at a time, each participant receiving them in 1 of 4
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different random orders. Participants were instructed to categorize the animals as quickly as they
could, without sacrificing accuracy. They received feedback after each categorization decision,
which they made by pressing a designated button on the keyboard. They then pressed another
designated button to go to the next stimulus screen. The training phase was identical in the rule
and exemplar memory conditions, except that rule participants used the rule.
The test phase was also identical for both experimental groups, with the same exception
that rule participants continued to use the rule. Each training animal corresponded to one positive
match and one negative match animal in the test phase. Unlike in the training phase, no feedback
was given in the test phase. Otherwise the procedures in both phases were identical.
The dependent measures were: the percentage of classification errors, and the reaction
times for accurate responses in the training and test phases.
Results
Training Phase
The data in the training phase established that all participants in both the rule and exemplar
memory conditions learned to categorize the animals, the learning curves being similar for the
three cultural groups. In the rule condition, a culture by trials analysis of variance (ANOVA)
revealed a linear decrease of classification errors across the four trials, F(3, 201) = 6.43, p < .001,
with no main effect of culture, F(2, 67) = 1.79, ns, or learning by culture interaction, F(6, 201) =
1.35, ns. Misclassifications, averaged across the three cultural groups, decreased from 20.7%
(first trial) to 11.3% (last trial). Similarly, reaction times decreased linearly across the four trials,
F(3, 201) = 42.30, p < .001 (M = 5586 ms, first trial vs. M = 3294 ms last trial). There was no
main effect of culture, F < 1, or learning by culture interaction, F < 1.
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Results were similar in the exemplar-memory condition. Classification errors decreased
linearly across the four trials, F(3, 231) = 10.49, p < .001, down from 51.9% (first trial), to 39.9%
(last trial), which was significantly better than chance (50%), t(79) = 4.62, p < .001. There was no
main effect of culture, F < 1, or culture by learning interaction, F < 1. Reaction times also
revealed a main effect of learning across the 4 trials, F(3, 231) = 7.88, p < .001, down from M =
1883 ms (first trial), to M = 1431 ms (last trial), with no main effect of culture, F < 1, or learning
by culture interaction, F < 1.
Test Phase: Rule Group versus Exemplar-Memory Group
Thus the three cultural groups in each condition learned to categorize successfully and
entered the test phase on an equal footing. Based on prior research, we expected that participants
in the rule condition would make fewer classification errors and have slower reaction times than
participants who instead had to rely on exemplar memory. An instruction (rule vs. exemplar
memory) by culture (European American, Asian American, East Asian) by match (positive vs.
negative, repeated measure) ANOVA indicated that this was indeed the case, with a main effect
for classification errors, F(1, 144) = 507, p < .001, and for reaction times, F(1, 144) = 124.30, p <
.001.
Test Phase: Exemplar-Memory Group
Categorization decisions were analyzed separately for participants who were given the rule
and for those who had to rely on exemplar memory, the latter serving as an experimental control
for the cultural predictions. The results for the exemplar-memory condition for classification
errors and reaction times are shown in Figure 2. For the negative match items the classification
error rate was reverse-scored, since in the absence of the rule the only correct response would be
to categorize based on similarity to past exemplars. As can be seen, participants’ categorization
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was significantly better than chance (i.e., 50%) for positive matches, t(79) = 6.58, p < .001, and
for negative matches t(79) = 8.16, p < .001. No cultural differences emerged for either
classification errors or reaction times, F(2, 77) = 1.18, ns, and F < 1, respectively. All cultural
groups learned the categories using exemplar memory equally well.
Test-Phase: Rule Group
Consistent with prior research, a repeated-measures ANOVA for the rule group indicated
that participants overall made more classification errors when the rule was in conflict with
exemplar memory (negative matches), than when there was no such conflict (positive matches),
F(1, 67) = 20.04, p < .001. A similar main effect emerged for reaction times, with slower reaction
times for negative than positive matches, F(1, 67) = 16.57, p < 001 (see Figure 3).
Most interestingly, the predicted cultural differences in the degree of classification errors
for negative as opposed to positive matches was obtained: there was a significant culture by item
type interaction, F(2, 67) = 3.81, p < .05. Analyses of partial interactions indicated that, as
expected, the negative-positive difference was larger for East Asians than European Americans,
F(1, 67) = 4.97, p < .05, and it was also larger for East Asians than Asian Americans, F(1, 43) =
7.49, p < .01 (see top panel of Figure 3). As to reaction times, there was a main effect of culture,
F(2, 67) = 3.43, p < .05, but no culture by item type interaction, F < 1. Analyses of simple effects
revealed that East Asians had slower reaction times than European Americans, F(1, 67) = 6.15, p
< .02, and Asian Americans, F(1, 67) = 3.86, p = .05 (see bottom panel of Figure 3).
Finally, two analyses were conducted to determine whether differences in English
language fluency could account for the cultural differences in category learning. Because most
East Asians were not native English speakers, and the study was conducted in English, it is
conceivable that their lesser fluency could have contributed to a weaker tendency to apply the
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rule, especially when the rule was in conflict with exemplar memory. This idea was tested in two
ways: (1) the rule group’s reported verbal SAT scores were correlated with their performance on
the negative match items, and (2) East Asian and Asian American participants in the rule
condition were pooled into a single sample (European Americans were excluded, because they
were all native English speakers), and separated by their reported native language (whether or not
they grew up speaking English or an East Asian language). If language fluency was a factor in
their performance, those who reported an East Asian language to be their native language should
have had higher error rates and slower reaction times for negative matches.
There was no evidence that the category learning results were influenced by English
language fluency. The correlations between verbal SATs and performance on negative match
items for the rule group were no different from zero, either for classification errors, r(58) = -.07,
or for reaction times, r(58) = .04 (11 participants failed to report their SAT scores). Nor did
reported native language matter. Participants who grew up speaking an East Asian language made
no more classification errors than native English speakers (M = 16.25 vs. M = 17.14), t < 1, nor
did they have slower reaction times (M = 3806 vs. M = 4207) , t(35) = 1.08, ns.
Discussion
Our central prediction was that a cultural difference would emerge in the extent to which
memory for exemplars would interfere with rule application when the two processes were in
conflict. The results supported this prediction. East Asians and European Americans categorized
equally well in the exemplar memory condition. In the rule condition, however, European
Americans and Asian Americans made fewer classification errors than East Asians for negative
matches – for which a conflict existed between rule- and exemplar-based categorization.  No
differences emerged for the positive matches -- for which no such conflict existed.
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Similarly, no cultural differences in response times emerged in the exemplar memory
condition, although East Asians’ response times in the rule condition were overall slower than
those of European Americans. One possible explanation for this finding is that there might be an
important difference between classification errors and reaction times. Since positive matches were
randomly intermixed with negative matches, participants who were particularly sensitive to
exemplar memory might have expected a conflict at any trial. Thus rule application might have
been harder for East Asians, in a context where the rule could conflict with exemplar-based
categorization for any given trial.  Finally, Asian Americans responded identically to European
Americans in all respects.
Study 2: Rule- vs. Family Resemblance-Based Classification and Similarity Judgments
Study 1 demonstrated that category learning based on the application of a formal rule was
easier for Americans than for East Asians when the rule conflicted with exemplar memory.
However, exemplar-based reasoning is only one strategy among many intuitive strategies, another
being family resemblance. This strategy draws on knowledge of graded membership of exemplars
within a category, such that some are believed to be more similar to the category than others
(Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953).
If Western thinking is more rule-governed and less intuitive than East Asian thinking,
Westerners may be more tempted to spontaneously locate objects in novel categories based on a
simple rule, and less willing to rely on family resemblance, whereas the reverse might be true for
East Asians. Study 2 tested this hypothesis.
Participants placed objects in one of two categories that could be defined on the basis of a
unidimensional rule or overall similarity (Kemler-Nelson, 1984). They saw a series of
presentations, each consisting of a “target” object beneath two groups or categories of four
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similar objects, as illustrated in Figure 4. In one condition, participants were asked to decide
which category the target object belonged to (the classification condition). Such free classification
has been shown to be unidimensional, as long as the stimuli allow scanning of an array of
dimensionalized objects, as was the case in this study (Ahn & Medin, 1992; Medin, Wattenmaker,
& Hampson, 1987). To encourage more strongly the use of an alternate family resemblance
strategy, other participants were instructed to judge which category the target object was most
similar to (the similarity judgment condition). The stimuli were constructed such that the
responses driven by the rule vs. family resemblance criterion led to different decisions.
Participants could rely on a unidimensional rule, deciding whether or not the target object shared
a single feature with all category members. Alternatively, they could rely on family resemblance,
judging the target object to be holistically similar to all members of a category because it shared a
large number of features with them, even though no one feature characterized all members of the
category. The anticipation was that East Asians would make less use of rules and more use of
family resemblance than would European Americans in both conditions. As to response times, it
was expected that the similarity instructions would produce faster response times than the
classification instructions. However, because making judgments based on a unidimensional rule or
on family resemblance are equally fast, there was no reason to expect cultural differences in
reaction times in this study.
Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Michigan (age M = 19). The
sample consisted of 52 European Americans (27 men, 25 women), 52 Asian Americans (28 men,
24 women), and 53 East Asians of Chinese and Korean ethnic background (27 men, 26 women).
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Stimuli
Figure 4 shows examples of the stimulus sets used. Each one had an abstract structure,
described in Table 1, constructed from a set of 4 binary features. Each stimulus set corresponded
to one item (e.g., flower, house), and was composed of a target object and two categories (Group
1 and Group 2), instantiated as four objects belonging to each category. The two categories and
the target object for each stimulus set were designed so that two alternative solutions were
possible. One of the four binary features always defined each category (e.g., all four instantiations
of the flower in one group had a short stem and all four in the other had a long stem). The other
three, non-deterministic features took on a different value for each category, such that each of the
four objects in each category contained 3 out of the 4 values, which together produced a strong
family resemblance structure that separated the two categories based on overall similarity. A rule-
based solution would select the deterministic feature that the target object shared with one of the
categories; a family-resemblance solution would select overall similarity of the target object to the
category members. Ten category pairs were used, each pair shown with
1 of the 2 alternative targets, counterbalancing the design, and yielding a total of 20 stimulus sets.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on a computer. All the instructions and materials
were in English, as all participants, including the East Asian students, were enrolled at an
American university and were fluent in English. Participants were randomly assigned to the
classification or the similarity judgment condition. In the classification condition, participants were
asked, for each stimulus set, to decide “which group the target object belongs to.” In the similarity
judgment condition, other participants were instructed to decide “which group the target object is
most similar to.”  Before seeing the actual stimuli, participants practiced with one sample stimulus
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set as a way to be familiarized to the task. At this point the experimenter verified that the
participant understood the instructions and was ready to begin. The stimulus sets were then
presented to participants in a random order. The computer program automatically moved to the
next screen as soon as a response was made. Participants were asked “to take their time while
responding, but not spend too much time on any single item.”
For each stimulus set, participants indicated their classification or similarity judgment
decision by pressing a designated button. The dependent measure was the percentage of rule and
family resemblance solutions for each participant, averaged across the 20 trials. Reaction times
(RT) were also recorded. Participants who were instructed to make categorization decisions were
expected to be slower than those who were asked to judge overall similarity (Smith, et al., 1998).
Results
The results are shown separately for the classification condition and the similarity
judgment condition. As seen in the top panel of Figure 5, participants overwhelmingly preferred
to classify based on the unidimensional rule rather than family resemblance, replicating past
research (e.g., Medin, et al., 1987), F(1, 100) = 44.40, p < .001 (M = 67% vs. M = 33%).
Contrary to predictions, there was no culture by response type interaction, F(2, 100) = 1.25, ns.
All three cultures substantially preferred rule-based over family resemblance classification, t(33) =
4.23, p < .001 for European Americans, t(33) = 2.48, p < .02 for Asian Americans, and t(34) =
4.94, p < .001 for East Asians.
Matters were different when participants were asked to judge the similarity of the target
object to the categories, as may be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 5. Under these instructions,
a marked cultural difference emerged. There was a significant culture by response type
interaction, F(2, 51) = 8.01, p < .005, and no main effect of response type, F < 1. European
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Americans gave many more responses based on the unidimensional rule than on family
resemblance, M = 69% vs. M = 31%), t(17) = 3.68, p < .005 (Indeed, they preferred the
unidimensional rule precisely to the same extent as when making classification decisions.) East
Asians, in contrast, gave fewer rule-based responses than family resemblance responses, t(17) =
2.09, p = .05, (M = 41% vs. M = 59%). Asian Americans were intermediate, having no preference
for rule vs. family resemblance responses (M = 46% vs. M = 54%), t < 1.
Reaction times were submitted to a culture by instruction condition (classification vs.
similarity judgment) ANOVA. Only a main effect of judgment condition emerged, indicating that
participants overall were slower when classifying than when judging similarity (in milliseconds, M
= 7516, SD = 3160, vs. M = 6260, SD = 4379), F(1, 151) = 4.25, p < .05. There were no main
effects of culture, F < 1, or culture by judgment condition interaction, F < 1.
Study 3: Conceptual Structure Based On Logic vs. Typicality
The first two studies probed categorization and similarity judgments of artificially
constructed categories. In contrast, in Study 3 we examined the extent to which people
spontaneously rely on formal rules versus intuition to mentally represent naturally occurring
categories. This was done by setting logic against the typicality of category exemplars. Typicality-
based reasoning relies on the similarity relations among particular exemplars of a category, with
typicality judgments usually (but not always) being a function of the number of features shared by
other category members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981). For example, penguins
are atypical birds because of their perceptual peculiarities – large body, small wings, no flying
ability -- that set them apart from other members of the category “bird.”1 This type of reasoning is
intuitive in that it relies on the perceptual features of actual category members, or on second-hand
knowledge of the perceptual features of exemplars of a category.
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In Study 3, we assessed reasoning preferences based on logic versus typicality,
investigating how people project fictitious or unknown features from a superordinate category
(e.g., bird) to subordinate categories of varying typicality (e.g., eagle, penguin) (Sloman, 1993).
Participants rated how convincing they found deductive categorical arguments such as:
1. All birds have ulnar arteries
Therefore all eagles have ulnar arteries
2. All birds have ulnar arteries
Therefore all penguins have ulnar arteries
There are two known strategies one can recruit to reason about these arguments -- one
formal, and the other intuitive. Reasoners following logic would “discover” the hidden premise in
each argument, that “All eagles are birds,” and “All penguins are birds.”  Once these hidden
premises are exploited, the argument becomes a standard valid deductive argument. Armed with
this knowledge, participants should be equally convinced by the typical and atypical arguments.
But the typicality of the conclusion category can affect people’s intuitions about the
convincingness of arguments to the extent that they are inclined to ground their reasoning in
intuition rather than logic. Sloman (1993) found that when both typical and atypical arguments
were evaluated by every participant (thus making typicality salient), American students showed a
typicality effect, being less convinced of atypical arguments than typical ones.
Study 3 examined this typicality effect cross-culturally. The phenomenon was evaluated
both within-groups (when typicality information is salient), and between-groups (when typicality
information is not salient). If East Asians are more likely than European Americans to rely on
intuition when it conflicts with logic, the typicality effect should be stronger for East Asians than
for European Americans, particularly when typicality is not made salient.
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Method
Participants
Ninety-two European American students (40 men, 52 women, age M = 19) and 74 Asian
American students at the University of Michigan (35 men, 39 women, age M = 19), as well as 93
Korean students at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea (49 men, 44 women, age M = 23)
participated for partial course credit. In addition, a separate group of 42 European American
students at Michigan (16 men, 26 women, age M = 19) and 42 Korean students at Yonsei (26
men, 16 women, age M = 22) rated the typicality of the conclusions as a manipulation check.
Materials
Materials were generated in collaboration with two bilingual Korean researchers to ensure
the functional equivalence of the materials. Care was taken to generate categories that were
equally familiar to Americans and Koreans, and having conclusion categories that were equally
typical or atypical in these cultures. Ten pairs of arguments were constructed using this
procedure. For each argument pair, the premise superordinate category was held constant, and the
typicality of the conclusion subordinate category was varied, with an unknown or a fictitious
feature being projected from the former to the latter category. Half of the arguments had typical
conclusions and the other half had atypical ones (see Table 2 for examples).
Procedure
The study was conducted in a classroom setting. Participants received a questionnaire
packet containing all the instructions and materials. They were instructed to evaluate the
convincingness of each argument on an 11-point scale:
0--------1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10
Very Unconvincing/Very Weak Very Convincing/Very Strong
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Because Study 3 was concerned with the spontaneous reliance on logic versus conclusion
typicality, the instructions did not provide any clues to respond logically to the arguments;
instead, participants were asked to “read each argument, assume that the facts given to you are
true, and using the scale, evaluate how convincing you believe each argument is.”
After responding to all 20 arguments, participants completed a brief demographic
questionnaire. They were given as much time as they needed, with all participants completing the
questionnaire within 10 minutes.  For Korean participants, all materials were translated into
Korean using the back-translation method (Brislin, 1970).
Salience of Typicality Manipulation
In contrast to previous studies of this phenomenon which have relied on an exclusively
within-groups methodology which makes typicality a salient feature of the task, the present study
manipulated the salience of typicality by counterbalancing the order of presentation of the typical
and atypical arguments. Half of the participants in each cultural group were randomly assigned to
evaluate all 10 typical arguments first, followed by all 10 atypical arguments (typical first
condition). The other half was randomly assigned to evaluate all 10 atypical arguments first,
followed by all 10 typical arguments (atypical first condition). Thus, the typicality effect was
evaluated in two ways: as a between-groups comparison of the first 10 typical versus atypical
arguments (low salience of typicality). The typicality effect was also measured as a between-
groups comparison of the last 10 typical and atypical arguments (high salience of typicality).
Manipulation Check
A separate group of European American and Korean students rated the typicality of the
conclusion categories to establish the effectiveness of the typicality manipulation and the
functional equivalence of the typicality information across cultures. Participants rated the
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typicality of the conclusions for each of the 20 arguments (for example, “how typical are eagles of
birds?”) on a scale anchored between 0 (Not at all typical) and 10 (Very typical). The items were
counterbalanced so that half rated typical ones first, and half rated atypical ones first.
Results
Manipulation Check
The typicality manipulation was successful. All typical conclusions were rated as more
typical than their atypical counterparts, for both European Americans and Koreans. Averaging
across the ten typical and ten atypical conclusions, the effect was highly reliable, for European
Americans, t(42) = 12.71, p < .001, typical M = 8.32, SD = 1.69, atypical M = 5.24, SD = 2.15,
and for Koreans, t(42) = 17.18, p < .001, typical M = 8.49, SD = 1.18, atypical M = 5.00, SD =
1.45. There was no culture by conclusion typicality interaction, F(1, 82) = 1.61, ns.
Convincingness of Arguments
We examined the results in a between-groups design separately where there was (1) low
salience of typicality (the first 10 arguments), and (2) high salience of typicality (the last 10
arguments).
Low Typicality Condition. The top panel of Figure 6 shows the convincingness ratings
when typicality salience was low (the first 10 arguments), allowing participants elbow room to set
aside typicality and follow logic. A culture (European American, Asian American, Korean) by
argument type (typical, atypical) between-groups ANOVA revealed a main effect of argument
type, as an indicator of the typicality effect, F(1, 253) = 25.76, p < .001. As predicted, a culture
by argument type interaction emerged, reflecting differing strengths of the typicality effect for
Koreans, European Americans, and Asian Americans, F(2, 253) = 4.67, p < .01. Analysis of
partial interactions indicated that, as predicted, the typicality effect was stronger for Koreans than
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European Americans, F(1, 253) = 9.09, p < .005, and it was marginally stronger for Koreans than
Asian Americans, F(1, 253) = 3.46, p = .06. European Americans and Asian Americans did not
differ, F < 1.
The cultural differences were most revealing when the typicality effect was evaluated
separately for each cultural group. As expected, a large typicality effect emerged for Koreans,
t(91) = 5.98, p < .001. It was marginally significant for Asian Americans, t(72) = 1.92, p = .06.
Most tellingly, European Americans did not show the typicality effect, t(90) = 1.16, p = ns.
Instead, their responses were consistent with logic, being equally convinced by both arguments.
High Typicality Salience condition. The bottom panel of Figure 6 presents the results
when salience of typicality was high (last 10 arguments). Reflecting the typicality effect, a culture
(European American, Asian American, Korean) by argument type (typical, atypical) between-
groups ANOVA revealed a main effect of argument type, with typical arguments being more
convincing than atypical ones, F(1, 253) = 94.59, p < .001. There was no culture by argument
type interaction, F < 1. Thus, all 3 groups showed the typicality effect to the same extent when
the salience of typicality was high.
Finally, the results were reexamined with typicality as a within-groups manipulation. In
this design, the expected cultural difference in the typicality effect emerged again, culture
(European American, Asian American, Korean) by argument type (typical, atypical) interaction,
F(2, 256) = 5.49, p < .005. An analysis of partial interactions revealed that the typicality effect
was larger for Koreans than for European Americans, F(1, 256) = 10.82, p < .005; it was
(marginally) larger for Asian Americans than European Americans, F(1, 256) = 3.62, p = .06; but
did not differ in magnitude between Koreans and Asian Americans, F(1, 256) = 1.44, p > .20.
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Study 4:  Logic vs. Belief in Deductive Reasoning
Evidence presented in Studies 1-3 indicates that the divergent intellectual traditions of
East Asia and the West may be reflected in the ways contemporary East Asians and Westerners
categorize and organize concepts. In Study 4 we examined the consequences of this cultural
difference for reasoning based on logical structure vs. empirical belief. Unlike Study 3, which did
not directly manipulate the logical structure of arguments, Study 4 included an orthogonal
variation of both the logical structure of arguments and the intuitive content of the conclusions.
Although cognitive psychologists have rarely examined the cultural bases of logical
reasoning, there exists one such program, rooted in the Vygotskian tradition, and developed by
early cultural psychologists (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971; Luria, 1971; Scribner, 1977). The
central finding of this research, conducted among non-Western cultures as diverse as Uzbek
farmers in the former Soviet Union, the Kpelle of West Africa, and the Maya in Mexico, has been
the participants’ unwillingness to decouple the content of the deductive problem from its logical
structure. For example, a Kpelle man was given the following problem: All Kpelle men are rice
farmers/Mr. Smith is not a rice farmer/Is he a Kpelle man? The man’s response, characteristic of
many of these participants, was, “I don’t know the man in person. I have not laid eyes on the man
himself.” (Scribner, 1977, p. 490). Thus, non-Westerners in these studies typically refused to
solve deductive problems, on the grounds that the content is unfamiliar or contrary to experience.
This suggests that knowledge may counter logic for non-Westerners to a greater extent than for
Westerners, especially when the two are in conflict.
In Study 4, such a cognitive conflict was created between the logical structure of a
deductive argument and the empirical plausibility of the argument’s conclusion. Participants
evaluated the logical validity of a series of categorical syllogisms and conditional arguments that
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were either valid or invalid and that had conclusions that were either believable or nonbelievable.
Moreover, at the end of the task, the same argument forms were presented in an abstract version
so as to assess logical reasoning independent of content. Finally a separate group of participants
rated the believability of each conclusion as a manipulation check and in order to establish the
functional equivalence of the believability manipulation across cultures.
To the extent that one’s reasoning is guided by intuitive knowledge, the believability of the
conclusion may interfere with logical evaluations. As a result, valid arguments with implausible
conclusions may be mistakenly thought to be invalid, and invalid arguments with plausible
conclusions may be mistakenly thought to be valid. This is known as the belief bias effect in
psychology (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; Oakhill
& Johnson-Laird, 1985; Revlin, Leirer, Yop, & Yop, 1980). On the other hand, to the extent that
one’s reasoning strategy favors logic, one should be willing or able to ignore the empirical content
of the conclusion and simply evaluate the argument in terms of its logical structure. This study
was a first investigation into possible cultural differences in this robust phenomenon. It was
expected that Koreans would show a stronger belief bias than European Americans. Furthermore,
this cultural difference in belief bias was expected to emerge holding logical reasoning ability
constant, as measured by performance on the abstract arguments.
Method
Participants
Eighty-seven European American students at the University of Michigan (35 men, 52
women, age M = 19) and 99 Korean students at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea (71 men, 28
women, age M = 23) participated in this study for partial course credit. In addition, a separate
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 27
group of 30 European Americans (12 men, 18 women, age M = 19) and 30 Koreans (18 men, 12
women, age M = 22) rated the believability of the conclusions as a manipulation check.
Materials
Argument validity was crossed with conclusion believability, generating 4 arguments for
each of the 4 following argument types: valid/believable, valid/nonbelievable, invalid/believable,
invalid/nonbelievable (see Table 3 for examples). After participants evaluated the 16 arguments,
they were asked to evaluate additional 8 arguments having the same logical structure as the prior
arguments except that they were presented in abstract form, and hence believability was
irrelevant. These abstract arguments were instantiated by letters and foreign unfamiliar words.
Thus, each participant evaluated a total of 24 arguments.
Each type of argument as described above in turn consisted of four kinds of valid logical
forms and their invalid counterparts that varied in difficulty: Modus Ponens (All A are B. C are A.
C are B.), Modus Tollens (All A are B. C are not B. C are not A.), Modus Tollens conditional
arguments conforming to a permission schema (If A is B, it may get C. X is not permitted to get
C. X is not B.), and an argument of the form: No A are B. Some C are B. Some C are not A.
Procedure
The study was conducted in a classroom setting. Participants received a questionnaire
packet containing the 24 syllogistic and conditional arguments. The concrete arguments consisting
of the 4 different types were listed in a scrambled order, followed by the abstract arguments, also
in scrambled order. For the Korean participants, all materials were translated into Korean using
the back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). Participants were given as much time as they needed,
with all participants completing the study within 20 minutes.
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Participants were instructed to evaluate whether or not the conclusion followed logically
from the premises for each argument (they had to circle either yes or no). Unlike in Study 3 in
which participants were not made aware that the task could be solved by applying logic, in this
study, strong instructions were presented that explicitly encouraged logical reasoning:
In this study, you are going to see a series of problems. In each problem, you must
decide whether the stated conclusion follows logically from the premises or not.
You must suppose that the premises are true and limit yourself only to information
contained in these premises. Do not be concerned if some of the terms in some of
the problems seem unfamiliar to you…For each problem, decide if the given
conclusion follows logically from the premises. Circle YES if, and only if, you
judge that the conclusion can be derived from the given premises. Otherwise circle
NO. You can take your time to answer each problem. However do not spend too
much time on any single problem.
The dependent measure was each participant’s percentage of “yes” responses for
each argument type, indicating whether or not the participant thought the conclusion of
the argument did follow logically from the premises.
A separate group of European American and Korean students rated the believability of the
conclusions, as a manipulation check for believability, and in order to establish the functional
equivalence of the believability information for both cultures. Participants rated the conclusions of
the 16 concrete arguments, deciding their believability on a scale anchored between  -3 (very
nonbelievable) and +3 (very believable), with zero being neither believable nor nonbelievable.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 29
Results
Manipulation Check
The believability manipulation was successful for both cultures: European Americans and
Koreans agreed that believable conclusions were indeed believable and nonbelievable ones were
indeed nonbelievable. Averaging across all 8 believable and 8 nonbelievable conclusions,
European Americans rated believable conclusions, M = 2.12, SD = .58, which is significantly
different from zero, t(29) = 19.92, p < .001, and they rated nonbelievable conclusions, M = -2.12,
SD = .43, which is also different from zero, t(29) = 27.39, p < .001. Similarly, Koreans’ ratings of
believable and nonbelievable arguments were different from zero, M = 1.29, SD = .79, t(29) =
8.93, p < .001, and M = -2.20, SD = .47, t(29) = 25.80, p < .001, respectively.
Although the ratings of European Americans and Koreans did not differ for nonbelievable
conclusions, t < 1, Koreans found believable conclusions to be significantly less believable than
did European Americans, t(58) = 4.63, p < .001. The weaker Korean commitment to the
believable conclusions works against finding support for the hypothesis of this study (for invalid
arguments), which predicts a stronger belief bias for Koreans. Results consistent with this
prediction, therefore, could not be due to differential commitment to the believable conclusions.
Abstract Arguments
Figure 7 presents the results for the abstract arguments. There was evidence for response
bias, such that Koreans were overall less likely to respond “yes”, F(1, 184) = 14.41, p < .001. To
evaluate performance in discriminating valid from invalid arguments while controlling for response
bias, a single measure of accuracy was computed: hits (percentage of “Yes”  responses for valid
arguments) minus false alarms (percentage of “Yes”  responses for invalid arguments). There was
no cultural difference in accuracy, t < 1, M = 45.1% and M = 48.5% for European Americans and
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Koreans, respectively. Consistent with this pattern, there was no culture by argument validity
interaction, F < 1. Thus any cultural differences found in belief bias cannot be attributed to
differences in logical reasoning ability.
As can be seen, participants’ reasoning, regardless of culture, tracked the logical structure
of the arguments. European Americans and Koreans rated valid arguments as valid at significantly
above chance (i.e., 50%), t(86) = 17.34, p < .001, and t(98) = 11.42, p < .001, respectively.
Similarly, they rated invalid arguments as not valid at significantly above chance, t(86) = 4.61, p <
.001, and t(98) = 9.75, p < .001, respectively.
Concrete Arguments
We anticipated that Koreans, relative to European Americans, would be more likely to
evaluate the arguments as valid when the conclusion is believable, and less likely to do so when
the conclusion is nonbelievable. A culture by argument validity by conclusion believability
ANOVA revealed a main effect of argument validity F(1, 184) = 1161.73, p < .001, indicating
sensitivity to logical structure; conclusion believability, F(1, 184) = 90.45, p < .001, indicating a
belief bias; and culture, F(1, 184) = 26.91, p < .001, indicating a response bias (discussed below).
Critically, there was a 3-way interaction between culture, argument validity, and conclusion
believability, F(1, 184) = 4.73, p < .05. This 3-way interaction reflects the fact that the belief bias
was stronger for valid than invalid arguments2, and that it was larger for Koreans than for
Americans, but only for valid arguments. Therefore, the belief bias effect was examined separately
for valid and invalid arguments, with culture as a between-groups factor, and conclusion
believability as a within-groups factor.
Valid Arguments. As may be seen in the top panel of Figure 8, the predicted interaction
was obtained: Koreans showed a stronger belief bias effect than Americans, F (1, 184) = 4.31, p
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 31
<.05. Overall, there was a belief-bias effect across cultures, F(1, 184) = 86.45, p < .001. As in
abstract arguments, there was a difference in response bias such that Koreans were overall less
likely to respond “yes,” F(1, 184) = 11.82, p < .002.
Invalid arguments. Contrary to predictions, no culture by conclusion believability
interaction emerged for invalid arguments, F < 1 (bottom panel of Figure 8). The belief bias effect
was replicated for invalid arguments, F(1, 184) = 25.27, p < .001. The response bias across
cultures emerged again, F(1, 184) = 13.43, p < .0013.
As was the case with abstract arguments, overall performance in the concrete arguments
was well calibrated to the logical structure of the concrete arguments. All 8 comparisons of the
means to the chance level were statistically significant at p < .001 for both European Americans
and Koreans, for both believable and nonbelievable arguments.
Discussion
In sum, Koreans showed a stronger belief bias effect than European Americans, though
only for valid arguments. Because European Americans and Koreans showed the same degree of
logical reasoning ability for the abstract arguments, we can conclude that the stronger belief bias
of Koreans was not due to differences in reasoning ability, but rather to differing tendencies to
decontextualize the content of an argument from its logical structure.
Why did we obtain a cultural difference in belief bias for valid but not invalid arguments?
Recall that in the manipulation check, separate groups of Koreans and Americans judged the
plausibility of the believable and nonbelievable conclusions. Both cultural groups found the
nonbelievable conclusions equally implausible. However Koreans found the believable conclusions
on average less plausible than did the Americans. Thus the same believable conclusions--contained
in the invalid arguments--were weaker for Koreans than for Americans. Since Koreans had a
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weaker belief only in the invalid arguments, they may have been less influenced by beliefs in the
invalid arguments. As a result, belief bias for the invalid arguments was not stronger for Koreans.
General Discussion
The present research investigated cultural preferences for formal and intuitive reasoning.
Formal reasoning is rule-based, emphasizes logical inference, represents concepts by necessary
and sufficient features, and overlooks sense experience when it conflicts with rules or logic.
Intuitive reasoning is experience-based, resists “decontextualizing” or separating form from
content, relies on sense experience and concrete instances, and overlooks rules and logic when
they are at odds with intuition.
We compared the reasoning of European American, Asian American, and East Asian
university students, under conditions where a cognitive conflict was activated between formal and
intuitive strategies of thinking. The central hypothesis was that European Americans would be
more willing to set aside intuition and follow rules than East Asians.
Study 1 showed that when a complex rule was in conflict with exemplar memory,
European Americans made fewer classification errors in category learning than East Asians.
European Americans were also faster in rule application than East Asians.  Learning based on
exemplars, in contrast, was entirely similar for East Asians and European Americans. Study 2
examined classification in which a simple rule was pitted against family resemblance structure.
When participants were asked to assign the object to a category, all participants, regardless of
culture, made their assignments based on the rule, consistent with prior research (e.g., Medin et
al., 1987). However, when instructions encouraged attention to all properties of the categories by
judging the similarity of the object to the categories, East Asians’ responses were most often
based on family resemblance, whereas those of European Americans were still based on the rule.
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Studies 3 and 4 examined thought processes that were less driven by immediate
perception, and relied on pre-existing concepts and beliefs. Study 3 pitted logic against exemplar
typicality. Participants rated the convincingness of deductive categorical arguments with either
typical or atypical conclusions. Koreans showed a strong typicality effect, whereas European
Americans produced responses that were consistent with logic. Moreover, Koreans were equally
affected by typicality whether or not typicality was made salient; European Americans were
affected by typicality only when it was salient. Finally, Study 4 investigated deductive reasoning,
pitting argument validity against conclusion believability. Whereas Americans and Koreans
showed similar deductive reasoning for abstract arguments, Koreans showed a stronger belief bias
effect (Revlin et al., 1980) for valid concrete arguments. (The same cultural difference did not
occur, however, for invalid arguments.)
The cultural differences emerged only when formal and intuitive strategies were in
conflict. There were no differences when participants were instructed simply to implement an
intuitive strategy (exemplar-based categorization in Study 1), or a formal strategy (abstract
deductive reasoning in Study 4). Although in each study we strived to rule out obvious
methodological artifacts, it is possible that each individual finding could be subject to an
alternative explanation. For this reason, we note that each specific cultural difference reported in
this paper should be interpreted with caution. However, our strategy of seeking converging
evidence from four rather different paradigms, using different sets of instructions, tasks, stimuli,
and cultural samples suggests that the best explanation for the cognitive differences that emerged
in these studies is that there are different cultural preferences for the use of cognitive strategies to
solve the same problem.
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In all three studies in which they were included, Asian Americans were either similar to
European Americans, or intermediate between European Americans and East Asians. This finding
perhaps reflects a substantial though not complete socialization of Asian Americans into the
Western mode of thought. Because Asian Americans are exposed to many of the same
extrafamilial experiences as European Americans (in that they largely experience the same societal
and educational environment), but are likely to differ in the kinds of intrafamilial and perhaps peer
socialization they receive, this finding suggests that intellectual socialization is at least partly due
to proximal influences4.
Possible Social Origins of the Cultural Differences in Reasoning
Why are Western and East Asian participants biased towards different modes of
reasoning? The attempt to answer this important question must of course be speculative at this
time because it involves complex sociological and historical issues beyond the scope of this paper,
and we leave it as an open question for the future. Here we mention briefly three factors that have
been identified by philosophers, ethnographers, and social historians (for a fuller discussion, see
Nisbett, et al., 2001). First, the practice of adversarial debate prevalent in Western cultures, as
opposed to the practice of consensus-based decision making prevalent in East Asia have been
linked to analytic versus holistic cognitive orientations, respectively (e.g., Lloyd, 1990; Ohbuchi
and Takahasi, 1994). Second, pedagogical practices emphasizing critical thinking in Western
classrooms, as opposed to experience-based learning in Chinese classrooms appear to encourage
differing modes of thinking in Western and East Asian societies (On, 1996; for a review, see
Tweed & Lehman, in press). Third, many historians of science and philosophy both Western and
East Asian have reported important cultural differences in the dominant philosophical traditions
that have influenced the intellectual practices in the West and East. Early Greek and Chinese
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philosophy, science, and mathematics were quite different in their strengths and weaknesses.
Many Greek philosophers looked for universal rules to explain events and were concerned with
categorizing objects with precision and with respect to their “essences.”  There was a marked
distrust of intuition. Chinese philosophers, especially Taoists, were more pragmatic and intuitive,
and were distrustful of formal logic and rational distinctions (Fung, 1952; Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990,
1996; Nakamura, 1960/1988; Needham, 1954; Russel, 1945; for a discussion of the evidence, see
Norenzayan, 1999).
We found cognitive differences in reasoning that to some degree mirror differences in
philosophical traditions. As provocative as this congruence may be, we cannot know at this time if
these traditions are actually implicated in such reasoning processes. Whether or not there is
psychological continuity between these philosophical traditions and reasoning processes remains
an open question. The findings reported in this paper and elsewhere (see Nisbett, et al.) can serve
as one starting point for such interdisciplinary investigation.
Normative Considerations: Reasoning Strategies as Tools for Thought
Although a full examination of normative issues is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
nevertheless important to mention several normative considerations.
A general point about analytic and holistic thinking is that each mode of thought produces
a mixed bag of normative and non-normative outcomes. For example, in deductive reasoning,
analytic thinkers tend to respond more logically than holistic thinkers, but in causal attribution, the
former more readily commit the fundamental attribution error than the latter. Conversely, holistic
thinkers are more accurate in covariation detection (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, in press), yet they are
more vulnerable to hindsight bias (Choi & Nisbett, 2000). Thus, neither the analytic nor the
holistic mode guarantees accuracy in reasoning.
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In two studies presented here, the East Asian reliance on intuitive processes led to less
accurate responses than the American reliance on rule-based approaches. In Study 1, East Asians
made more errors when asked to categorize the negative matches--for which a conflict existed
between rule-based and exemplar-based judgments. We note, however, that under other task
conditions intuitive responses could lead to more accurate responses than would formal
processes. One circumstance that favors reliance on an intuitive strategy occurs when a rule is
only partially predictive, like many rules in everyday life. For example, in the category learning
procedure of Study 1, suppose the rule were made only partially predictive of the categories, such
that it would accurately predict category membership for positive match animals, but would
predict the wrong category for negative match animals. In such a situation, it has been shown that
switching to an exemplar-based strategy leads to superior overall performance than continuing to
use the rule (e.g., Allen & Brooks, 1991, Experiment 4), and East Asians might perform more
accurately than European Americans (a proposal that remains to be tested).
East Asians also made more errors in Study 4, in which they were explicitly asked to judge
the logical validity of the concrete arguments, as opposed to their plausibility or convincingness.
Though this is an error, and undoubtedly one that would have been acknowledged by the
participants themselves given their performance with fully abstract materials, it is the result of a
bias that does not always yield less reasonable conclusions than the rationalistic bias of
Westerners. Indeed, many East Asian scholars have noted that in East Asian cultures logic does
not enjoy the normative status that it does in the West. In Japanese culture, for example, “to argue
with logical consistency is thus discouraged, and if one does so continuously one may not only be
resented but also be regarded as immature (Nagashima, 1973, p. 96). Liu (1974) makes a similar
point about China when he writes, “…it is precisely because the Chinese mind is so rational that it
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refuses to become rationalistic and … refuses to separate form from content” (p. 325). Consistent
with these assertions, recent evidence indicates that Koreans rank “being an intuitive person” to
be important for work success more than Americans, whereas the opposite is true for “being a
logical person” (Norenzayan & Sanchez-Burks, 2002). Furthermore, in some of the research
conducted by our colleagues, European Americans have been shown to make errors, in their
efforts to be logically consistent, that actually result in judgments that are incoherent in the sense
that one judgment actually follows from the opposite of the other (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Davis,
Nisbett, & Schwarz, 2000). These errors were avoided by East Asian participants, who, however,
made logical errors of their own in their attempts to reconcile opposing views.
  The philosopher Stephen Stich (1990) has said that “there are no intrinsic epistemic
virtues…cognitive mechanisms or processes are to be viewed as tools or policies and evaluated in
much the same way that we evaluate other tools or policies” (1990, p. 24). If there are culturally
diverse ways to go about the business of cognition, and if there are culturally diverse systems of
justification which serve the needs of various cognitive communities, then the reasonable
philosophical position would be to evaluate thinking in terms of the local standards of
justification, as well as specific task requirements (Stich, 1990; see also Resnick, 1994). This is
not to say that it is unreasonable to criticize specific inferential practices, even by the standards of
another culture, but just that criticism must be cognizant both of inferential goals and cultural
context.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 38
References
Ahn, W., & Medin, D. L. (1992). A two-stage model of category construction. Cognitive
Science, 16, 81-121.
Allen, S. W., & Brooks, L. R. (1991). Specializing in the operation of an explicit rule.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 120, 3-19.
Arnheim, R. (1969). Visual thinking. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Atran, S. (1990). Cognitive foundations of natural history. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 1, 185-216.
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999) Dual-process theories in social psychology .
New York: Guilford Press.
Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). The cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories
and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79 890-905.
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures:
Variation and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47-63.
Cole, M., Gay, J., Glick, J. A., & Sharp, D. W. (1971). The cultural context of learning
and thinking: An exploration in experimental anthropology. New York: Basic Books.
Davis, M., Nisbett, R. E., & Schwarz, N. (2000). Responses to weak arguments by East
Asians and Americans . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Evans, J. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and
belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory and Cognition, 11, 295-306.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 39
Evans, J. B. T., & Handley, S. J., Harper, C. N. J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999).
Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. Journal
of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, 1495-1513.
Evans, J. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press.
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight's foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment
under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1,
288-299.
Fung, Y. L. (1952). A history of Chinese philosophy (D. Bodde, Trans.). (Vol. I).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gentner, D., & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development of rules. Cognition, 65,
263-297.
Gilbert, D.T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107-119.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Dover Publications.
Ji, L., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (in press). Culture, control, and perception of
relationships in the environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Kashima, Y., Yamaguchi, S., Kim, U., Choi, S., Gelfand, M. J., & Yuki, M. (1995).
Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 925-937.
Keil, F. (1994). The birth and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts
of living things. In L. Hirschfeld & S. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in
cognition and culture. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kemler-Nelson, D. G. (1984). The effect of intention on what concepts are acquired.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23, 734-759.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 40
Liu, S. H. (1974). The use of analogy and symbolism in traditional Chinese philosophy.
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1, 313-338.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1990). Demystifying mentalities. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1996). Science in antiquity: the Greek and Chinese cases and their
relevance to the problems of culture and cognition. In D. R. Olson & N. Torrance (Eds.), Modes
of thought: Explorations in culture and cognition (pp. 15-33). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Luria, A. (1971). Towards the problem of the historical nature of psychological processes.
International Journal of Psychology, 6, 259-272.
Medin, D. L., Wattenmaker, W. D., & Hampson, S. E. (1987). Family resemblance,
conceptual cohesiveness, and category construction. Cognitive Psychology, 19, 242-279.
Nagashima, N. (1973). A reversed world: Or is it? In R. Horton, & R. Finnegan (Eds.),
Modes of thought: Essays on thinking in Western and non-Western societies (pp. 92-111).
London: Faber and Faber.
Nakamura, H. (1960/1988). The ways of thinking of eastern peoples. New York:
Greenwood Press.
Needham, J. (1954). Science and civilization in China (Vol 1). Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Neisser, U. (1963). The multiplicity of thought. British Journal of Psychology, 54, 1-14.
Newstead, S. E., Pollard, P., Evans, J. B. T., & Allen, J. L. (1992). The source of the
belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. Cognition, 45, 257-284.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 41
Nisbett, R.E., & Norenzayan, A. (in press). Culture and cognition. In D. L. Medin (Ed.),
Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology: Cognition (3d Ed).  New York: John Wiley &
Sons.
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of
thought: Holistic vs. analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291-310.
Norenzayan, A. (1999). Rule-based and experience-based thinking: The cognitive
consequences of intellectual traditions. Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor.
Norenzayan, A., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture and causal cognition. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 9, 132-135.
Norenzayan, A., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2002). A time for logic and a time for intuition:
Normative evaluations of reasoning styles across cultures and contexts. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Oakhill, J. V., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1985). The effects of belief on the production of
syllogistic conclusions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37A, 553-569.
Ohbuchi, K. I., & Takahashi, Y. (1994). Cultural styles of conflict management in
Japanese and Americans: Passivity, covertness, and effectiveness of strategies. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 24, 1345-1366.
On, L. W. (1996). The cultural context of Chinese learners: Conception of learning in the
Confucian tradition. In D. A. Watkins & J. B. Biggs (Eds.), The Chinese learner: Cultural,
psychological, and contextual influences (pp. 25-42). Hong Kong: Comparative Education
Research Centre.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 42
Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.
American Psychologist, 54, 741-754.
Regehr, G., & Brooks, L. R. (1993).  Perceptual manifestations of an analytic structure:
The priority of holistic individuation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 92-114.
Resnick, L. B. (1994). Situated rationalism: Biological and social preparation for learning.
In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition
and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Revlin, R., Leirer, V., Yop, H., & Yop, R. (1980). The belief-bias effect in formal
reasoning: The influence of knowledge on logic. Memory and Cognition, 8, 584-592.
Rips, L. J. (1989). Similarity, typicality, and categorization. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.),
Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure
of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573-605.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, ). New York: Academic Press.
Russell, B. (1945). A history of Western philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Scribner, S. (1977). Modes of thinking and ways of speaking: Culture and logic
reconsidered. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science
(pp. 483-500). New York:: Cambridge University Press.
Sloman, S. (1993). Feature-based induction. Cognitive Psychology, 25, 231-280.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 43
Sloman, S. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological
Bulletin-, 119, 30-22.
Smith, E. E., Langston, C., & Nisbett, R. E. (1992). The case for rules in reasoning.
Cognitive Science, 16, 1-40.
Smith, E. E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Smith, E. E., Patalano, A. L., & Jonides, J. (1998). Alternative strategies of
categorization. Cognition, 65, 167-196.
Smith, J. D., & Kemler, D. G. (1984). Overall similarity in adults' classification: The child
in all of us. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 137-159.
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Stich, S. P. (1990). Fragmentation of reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
Tweed, R. G., & Lehman, D. R. (in press). Learning considered within a cultural context:
Confucian and Socratic approaches. American Psychologist.
Witkin, H. A., & Berry, J. W. (1975). Psychological differentiation in cross-cultural
perspective. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 6, 4-87.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 44
Author Note
This research is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted by Ara Norenzayan under the
guidance of Richard Nisbett to the University of Michigan. Scott Atran, Jonathan Evans, Eric
Lormand, Norbert Schwarz, and Yingrui Yang provided valuable comments on an earlier draft.
We thank Viola Chen, Jason Drwal, Sally Harrison, Young Ho Hong, Jong Dae Kim, Yookyong
Lee, Mehyun Song, and Miguel Wong for their assistance in conducting this research, and Andrea
Patalano for providing the stimuli for Study 1.
This research was supported by a Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship of the University of
Michigan and an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship to Ara Norenzayan, and by an NSF grant
(SBR 9729103) to Richard Nisbett.
Address correspondence to Ara Norenzayan, Department of Psychology, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61820.
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 45
Footnotes
1 In this study, typicality describes a kind of intuitive reasoning distinct from family resemblance.
Typicality is used to refer to peoples’ intuitions about the “goodness” of naturally occurring
exemplars, whereas family resemblance is objectively determined as the proportion of features
shared among category members, as in Study 2.
2 That the belief bias was larger for valid than invalid arguments is surprising. Typically, the belief
bias tends to be larger for invalid than valid arguments (Evans & Over, 1996; Newstead et al.,
1992). However, this interaction can be reliably eliminated, and even non-significantly reversed,
when (1) strong instructions are used that emphasize logical reasoning and logical necessity, or
(2) when the invalid arguments are determinately invalid, that is, invalid because the conclusion
definitely fails to follow from the premises. In contrast, indeterminately invalid arguments are
invalid because the premises give insufficient information to judge whether the conclusion holds
or not (Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999; for a discussion, see Newstead et al.,
1992). Both of these factors were simultaneously present in this study. That is, very strong logical
instructions were used, and 3 of the 4 invalid argument forms were determinately invalid. This
could explain why the impact of belief was reversed, i.e., a stronger belief bias effect was found
for valid arguments.
3 Two of the four argument forms used in this study did not have “ALL” quantifiers for the second
premise and the conclusion (second and third argument forms in Table 3). It is possible that this
could have created quantifier ambiguity, i.e., interpreting them in terms of existential (SOME)
instead of universal (ALL) quantifiers. Note, however, that there was no evidence in the solution
rates to these particular arguments that this was the case. Nor is there any reason to believe that
this potential ambiguity was any different for the two cultures. Nevertheless, we reanalyzed the
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data by considering only the argument forms that explicitly stated all the quantifiers (First and
fourth argument forms in Table 3, for a total of 8 arguments). Almost identical results were
obtained: there was a main effect of logic, F(1, 184) = 696.50, p < .001; a main effect of belief,
F(1, 184) = 85.35, p < .001; a main effect of culture, F(1, 184) = 26.72, p < .001 (reflecting the
difference in response bias), and a 3-way logic by belief by culture interaction, F(1, 184) = 5.17, p
< .03, indicating a stronger belief bias for Koreans, but only for valid arguments. Culture by belief
interaction for valid arguments, F(1, 184) = 3.07, p = .08, and for invalid arguments, F(1, 184) =
1.95, p = ns.
4 Although this research was not concerned with gender, post-hoc analyses were conducted to
examine gender differences in thinking except for Study 1 (where there was an inadequate sample
size). Overall, women were somewhat more likely to rely on intuitive strategies, whereas men
were more likely to rely on formal rules. Importantly, the gender differences were orthogonal to
the cultural differences. Also, the gender differences tended to be less reliable and smaller in size
than the cultural differences. This pattern of cultural and gender differences reinforces prior
research indicating that that there is greater psychological similarity among men and women of the
same culture than people of different cultures who share the same gender (Kashima et al., 1995).
The analyses for gender differences are available from the first author.
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Table 1. Category Structures in Study 2.
Group 1 Group 2
0000 1111
0100 1011
0010 1101
0001 1110
Target Objects
0111
1000
Note. The two categories (groups) in each stimulus set were instantiated in four exemplars per
group, varying on four binary features. The value of each binary feature is represented as 0 or 1.
Each row represents one exemplar, and each column represents the distribution of values for one
feature. The first column corresponds to the defining rule.
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Table 2. Selected Arguments in Study 3.
________________________________________________________________________
Arguments with Typical Conclusions
1. All birds have an ulnar artery
Therefore, all eagles have an ulnar artery
2. All professionals do community service in Tahiti
Therefore, all doctors do community service in Tahiti
3. All clothing is made of Supsa leaves in the Island of Pago-Pago
Therefore, all shirts are made of Supsa leaves in the Island of Pago-Pago
4. All diseases can be understood in terms of the Shawinigan principle
Therefore all cancer can be understood in terms of the Shawinigan principle
Arguments with Atypical Conclusions
1. All birds have an ulnar artery
Therefore, all penguins have an ulnar artery
2. All professionals do community service in Tahiti
Therefore, all bankers do community service in Tahiti
3. All clothing is made of Supsa leaves in the Island of Pago-Pago
Therefore, all raincoats are made of Supsa leaves in the Island of Pago-Pago
4. All diseases can be understood in terms of the Shawinigan principle
Therefore all cholera can be understood in terms of the Shawinigan principle
Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning 49
Table 3. Selected Arguments in Study 4.
__________________________________________________________________________
Valid/Believable
Premise 1: No police dogs are old
Premise 2: Some highly trained dogs are old
Conclusion: Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs
Valid/Nonbelievable
Premise 1: All things that are made of plants are good for the health
Premise 2: Cigarettes are things that are made of plants
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health
Invalid/Believable
Premise 1: All tall athletes have large foot size
Premise 2: Famous basketball players have large foot size
Conclusion: Famous basketball players are tall athletes
Invalid/Nonbelievable
Premise 1: If a country is a member of the European Community, it is permitted to apply
for loans from the European Bank
Premise 2: India is not permitted to apply for loans from the European Bank
Conclusion: India is a member of the European Community
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli (Study 1). Rule: Animal lives on VENUS if it has at least 3 of the
following 5 features: curly tail, hooves, antennae ears, mouth, long neck. Otherwise it lives on
SATURN.
Figure 2. Category learning: Mean classification error rates and reaction times for the exemplar
memory group.
Figure 3. Category learning: Mean classification error rates and reaction times for the rule group.
Figure 4. Examples of stimuli (Study 2). Each of the two target objects was presented separately
with the two groups to achieve a counterbalanced design. For the flowers, the defining feature is
the stem length; for the geometric figures, it is the top-most string.
Figure 5. Classification and similarity judgments by rule vs. family resemblance.
Figure 6. Convincingness of deductive arguments with typical vs. atypical conclusions, as a
function of typicality salience.
Figure 7. Deductive reasoning with abstract arguments: Mean percent “valid” responses.
Figure 8. Deductive reasoning with concrete arguments having valid or invalid logical structure:
Mean percent “valid” responses.
